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PEOPLE V. FLOYD: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST
INTENTIONALIST INTERPRETATION OF VOTER
INITIATIVES
Evan C. Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The strategic use of direct democracy1 has been on the
rise for some time, and is a dominant feature in the landscape
of California politics.2 In 2003, the recall procedure resulted
in the replacement of the state's governor.3 Additionally,
voter initiatives4 have addressed a wide range of issues in-
cluding ending affirmative action and creating the "Three
Strikes" criminal law.5
The California electorate has also successfully used the
voter initiative to reject certain aspects of the "war on drugs."
* Symposium Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 45; J.D. Candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.S. Business Economics, University of
California, Davis. He would like to thank his wife, his parents, and Professor
Gerald Uelman for their support and encouragement.
1. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": Interpretive Dilemmas
in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 112-13 (1995) (explaining how voters
may use direct democracy methods at the polls to remove elected officials or en-
act state law).
2. See id. at 115 (noting that out of the twenty-one states that allow some
form of direct democracy, California is the leader in "direct lawmaking").
3. See CNN Staff Writer, Davis Concedes, Schwarzenegger Wins, CNN.com,
Oct.8, 2003 [hereinafter Schwarzenegger], at
http'J/www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/recall.main/ (last visited Aug. 5,
2005) (explaining how Arnold Schwarzenegger became governor of California
after Gray Davis was recalled by the voters and Schwarzenegger received the
greatest number of votes among the candidates for replacement governor).
4. Schacter, supra note 1, at 113 & n.22. A voter initiative allows the elec-
torate to place proposed laws on a ballot if the initiative petition obtained the
required number of signatures. Id. Once on the ballot, a majority vote decides
whether the initiative passes.
5. DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 89 (1984).
6. See Bill Ainsworth, Meddling Tycoons or Visionary Activists: 3 Push
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With these drug initiatives the electorate signaled its desire
for the state to change its views and practices relating to drug
use and dependency.7 In 2000, California voters passed
Proposition 36, which mandates treatment, as opposed to in-
carceration, for individuals convicted of drug possession or
use.8
Because an initiative originates directly from the people,
it differs from a legislative enactment in several significant
ways.' Voters often do not comprehend an initiative's lan-
guage or range of impacts, and an initiative is not subject to
dissection in legislative committees."° However, despite these
differences, courts tend to interpret initiatives in the same
manner as a statute, by attempting to determine "legislative
intent"-that is, the intent of the voters.1
The California Supreme Court took this intentionalist"2
approach in People v. Floyd,3 resulting in the defendant serv-
ing twenty-five years to life for possessing a quarter of a gram
of cocaine. 4 Therefore, to avoid future decisions that poten-
tially thwart the objective of an initiative, California courts
should rely upon purposive or dynamic theories of interpreta-
tion' 5 that are better suited for acknowledging an electorate's
Drug Initiative, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 9, 2000. Additionally, in the 1996
general election, California voters approved Proposition 215, legalizing the pos-
session and cultivation of marijuana for medical use. Id.
7. See David Bank, Super-Wealthy Threesome Fund Growing War on the
War on Drugs, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2001, at B2.
8. See Cal. Sec'y of State, Vote 2000 Voter Guide (2000) [hereinafter Voter
Guide], available at
http://vote2000.ss.ca.govNoterGuide/texttext-summary_36.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005).
9. Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assess-
ment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 487, 490 (1998).
10. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 139-40. See also, Landau, supra note 9, at
490.
11. Id. at 491,495.
12. Schacter, supra note 1, at 123-24.
13. People v. Floyd, 72 P.3d 817 (Cal. 2003); see generally Daniel Abraham-
son & Jaffer Abbasi, SACPA's Sophomore Year: The Second Annual Review of
Proposition 36 in California's Courts, 2003 CAL. CRIM. DEF. PRAC. RPTR. 517,
519 (2003).
14. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821, 831 (affirming the sentence imposed by the trial
court).
15. See Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy:
Lessons from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 297-98
(2003) (discussing the most common theories of judicial interpretation: inten-
tionalist, purposive, textual, and dynamic).
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understanding and expectations.
Part II of this comment provides background information
regarding Proposition 36, categories of direct democracy,
theories of statutory interpretation, and canons of statutory
construction. 6 It also discusses the judicial developments of
Proposition 36 implementation, including an overview of the
holding and analysis in Floyd.7 Part III presents the problem
of attempting to use intentionalist methods to construe voter
initiatives. 8 Part IV is an analysis and critique of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's textual and intentionalist decision in
Floyd.9 Finally, Part V suggests that when faced with a voter
initiative, California courts should reject an intentionalist
view in favor of a purposive or dynamic approach, combined
with the appropriate application of substantive canons of con-
struction. °
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Goals of Proposition 36
On November 7, 2000, Proposition 36-The Substance
Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 ("Act" )2 -was ap-
proved by California voter initiative in the general election.2
It represents a substantial change in California drug en-
forcement policy by mandating treatment over incarceration
for certain drug convictions. 2 With its passage, a defendant
convicted of drug possession or use must be offered entrance
into a probationary addiction treatment program instead of
facing incarceration.24
Supporters of the Act focused on its potential for increas-
16. See infra Parts II.C-II.E.
17. See infra Part II,F.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210 (West Supp. 2005).
22. CA DEPT. OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000 FACT SHEET, available at
http://www.adp.ca.gov/SACPA/prop36.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
23. UCLA & INTEGRATED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS, EVALUATION OF
THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT 2002 REPORT 5 [hereinaf-
ter UCLA 2002], available at
http://www.uclaisap.org/prop36/documentsfEvaluation of the Substance Abuse
and Crime Prevention Act 2002 Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
24. See Voter Guide, supra note 8.
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ing public health and safety "by reducing drug-related crime
and preserving jails and prison cells for serious and violent
offenders, and.., by reducing drug abuse and drug depend-
ence through proven and effective drug treatment strate-
gies."25 A primary reason for accomplishing this goal is the
Act's anticipated effect on California's "back door" parole sys-
tem, "where 46% of all parole violations resulting in incar-
ceration involve non-violent drug violations."26
Support for the initiative was well funded and far-
reaching," garnering 61% of the popular vote in the 2000
general election. 8 Proponents for the initiative spanned the
political spectrum, with views ranging from consideration of
various drug addiction treatments, to more complex argu-
ments regarding the personal liberty interests involved.29
Additionally, while Proposition 36 appealed to some vot-
ers' intellect and emotions, it also posed a financial benefit for
California's treasury. ° The non-partisan Legislative Ana-
lyst's Office ("LAO") predicted that prison diversion would re-
sult in a $200- to $250-million annual cost savings in prison
operations, and a $450- to $550-million one-time savings in
prison construction.3
These initial predictions appear to have been vindicated
with the release of the first annual study of Proposition 36
and its statewide impact.32 Conducted by UCLA, the compre-
hensive non-partisan study estimates state savings of $275
25. Proposition 36, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF
2000, § 3(c) (citing section entitled "Purpose and Intent"), available at
http'//www.drugreform.orgprop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
26. CALIFORNIA CAMPAIGN FOR NEW DRUG POLICIES, PAROLE SERVICES
PROP. 36 FACT SHEET (2000) ( stating that the "back door" parole system refers
to parole violations, as opposed to initial criminal convictions, as the cause of
incarceration), at http//www.drugreform.org/prop36/parole.tpl (last visited Mar.
25, 2005).
27. See Ainsworth, supra note 6.
28. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
29. Jeffrey S. Tauber, How California Drug Laws Were Re-Written by Prop.
36, A GUIDE TO DRUG-RELATED STATE BALLOT INITIATIVES, at
http://www.nationalfamilies.orgtguide/tauber.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
30. CAL. SEC. OF STATE, ANALYSIS BY LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (citing to ballot
pamphlet summarizing Proposition 36's fiscal effects), available at
http://vote2000.ss.ca.govNoterGuide/text/text-analysis-36.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2005).
31. Id.
32. Press Release, Tony Newman, Prop. 36 Exceeds Expectations With
Huge Savings, (July 17, 2003), at http://www.prop36.org/pr071703.html (last
visited Apr. 9, 2004).
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million, exceeding the LAO's predictions." The study re-
ported that 37,495 individuals opted for drug treatment and
placement assessment instead of jail or prison sentences. 4 In
the second year of implementation, this figure rose to
50,335.35
Although the Act's relatively recent enactment prevents a
statistical understanding of its effect on societal welfare, posi-
tive benefits may be inferred by noting that there is a 66%
reduction in repeat criminal activity when criminal drug
36
abusers obtain drug treatment.
B. Support and Funding for Drug Initiatives
Financing for the initiative was spearheaded by three
wealthy drug policy activists: University of Phoenix founder
John Sperling, Progressive Auto Insurance Chief Executive
Officer Peter Lewis, and billionaire financier/philanthropist
George Soros." Along with smaller contributors, they spent
approximately $3 million in their successful effort to pass the
initiative, while the anti-Proposition 36 coalition mustered
only $215,000.38 The bulk of contributions to the opposition
campaign came from San Diego Chargers owner Alex Spanos
and the California prison guards' union."
The influential trio has been successful in reforming drug
policy throughout the country by facilitating the passage of
twelve out of thirteen ballot initiatives.40 They first came to-
gether in 1996, joining forces and financial clout to win pas-
sage of Arizona's Proposition 200, on which Proposition 36 is
modeled, and California's Proposition 215, legalizing medical
marijuana." Both propositions successfully garnered nearly
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. UCLA & INTEGRATED SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAMS, EVALUATION OF
THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT REPORT, 25 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.uclaisap.orgfProp36/reports.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
36. CALIFORNIA CAMPAIGN FOR NEW DRUG POLICIES, LOCAL LAw EN-
FORCEMENT PROPOSITION 36 FACT SHEET (2000), at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/locallaw.tpl (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
37. Ainsworth, supra note 6.
38. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 296.
39. Ainsworth, supra note 6 (officially known as the California Correctional
Peace Officers Association).
40. Id.
41. Bank, supra note 7 (providing an overview of the history and relation-
ships between Soros, Lewis, and Sperling as they have used the voter initiative
9852005
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
two-thirds of the vote in the 1996 general election. 2
C. Fundamentals of Proposition 36
At its core, Proposition 36 requires that any individual
convicted of a "non-violent drug possession offense" be given
the option of entering a drug treatment program, with suc-
cessful completion serving as the primary probationary condi-
tion.4'3 As defined by the Act, an offense of this type includes
the "unlawful possession, use, or transportation for personal
44
use" of any controlled substance.
However, the treatment option will not be offered if cir-
cumstances surrounding the offense are of a type specifically
prohibited by the Act.45 For example, if within the previous
five years the defendant was jailed, convicted of a felony, or
convicted of a misdemeanor involving physical injury, bene-
fits of the Act will be denied.46 Additionally, if the defendant
uses a firearm in conjunction with the drug-related offense, or
is clearly found to be unamenable to treatment, eligibility will
be withheld. 47 Finally, the Act's coverage will be denied to
"any defendant who, in addition to one or more non-violent
drug possession offenses, has been convicted in the same pro-
ceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or
any felony."48  A "misdemeanor not related to the use of
drugs" is defined as a misdemeanor not involving the "simple
possession or use of drugs" and any similar activity. 9
Although modeled after Proposition 200, Proposition 36
differs significantly from its Arizona counterpart in how it
addresses non-compliance and probation revocation. ° With a
method mirroring California's increasingly punitive "Three
Strikes" law, a probationer under the Act is allowed several
drug-related parole violations, with each successive violation
creating a greater risk of having probation revoked and im-
process to fight against the War on Drugs).
42. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 293; Bank, supra note 7.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a) (West Supp. 2005).
44. Id. § 1210(a) (providing definitions for key terms in the Act).
45. Id. § 1210.1(b).
46. Id. § 1210.1(b)(1).
47. Id. § 1210.1(b)(3)(a), 12.01(b)(4)-(5).
48. Id. § 1210.1(b)(2).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2005).
50. See id. § 1210.1(e); O'Hear, supra note 15, at 295.
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prisonment imposed.51
With the first probation violation, incarceration can re-
sult only if the state proves through a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant "poses a danger to the safety of
others."52 Upon a second violation, the state must prove ei-
ther the above condition or that defendant is unamenable to
treatment. 53  When a third violation occurs, the defendant
loses probation eligibility altogether and may face incarcera-
tion.54
D. Direct Democracy and Voter Initiatives
Direct democracy represents a form of raw government
decision making that eliminates the conciliation and com-
promise inherent in the United States' standard form of rep-
resentative government, where our elected legislative body
debates the objectives and intricacies of a proposed law before
its final approval or rejection.5 Voters may directly express
their will in three general ways: the recall, the referendum,
and the initiative.56
California's recall election in 2003 was at the forefront of
national discussion and debate, with the state's electorate re-
calling then-Governor Gray Davis and replacing him with
Arnold Schwarzenegger.57 By contrast, the referendum is a
process in which the legislature refers a statute to the voters
for approval,"R thus diversifying the responsibility for its im-
pact between the elected representatives and the voters.59 Fi-
nally, the voter initiative bypasses the legislature alto-
gether."
The District of Columbia and twenty-one states allow for
the voter initiative. 1 A critical first step in the process in-
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(e)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 2005).
52. Id. § 1210.1(e)(3)(A).
53. Id. § 1210.1(e)(3)(B).
54. Id. § 1210.1(e)(3)(C).
55. Schacter, supra note 1, at 112-13.
56. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 285-86 (the typical process for a direct democ-
racy device involves initially obtaining the requisite number of signatures on a
petition to place a proposal on a ballot, followed with voters determining by a
majority vote whether the proposal passes or fails).
57. See Schwarzenegger, supra note 3.
58. Schacter, supra note 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 113-14.
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volves collecting petition signatures for a proposition." If the
requisite number of signatures is obtained, the proposition is
placed on the ballot and voters decide by a majority vote if it
will pass or fail."8
As the popularity of the initiative process has increased,
commentators have advocated that courts use new interpre-
tive frameworks when facing initiative implementation ques-
tions.' These proposals are based on the significant differ-
ences between the traditional legislatively enacted statute
and the relatively unique voter initiative.65
The difficulty of ascertaining voter intent, when voters
may number in the millions, is one of the oft-cited problems
when comparing a legislative statute to an initiative.66 Addi-
tionally, an initiative's language is not subject to careful re-
finement through a representative committee process, result-
ing in a take-it-or-leave-it dilemma for the voters.67
Despite these differences, courts have not generally
adopted new methods of interpretation when analyzing an
initiative. 8 They continue instead to rely upon traditional
theories and canons of statutory interpretation.6 9
E. Modern Statutory Interpretation
Because courts have resisted new approaches for direct
62. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 286-87; Schacter, supra note 1, at 128-30
(discussing the "initiative industry" and the role of business interests and politi-
cal consultants in the initiative drafting process).
63. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 286; Schacter, supra note 1, at 128-30; see
Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures
That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 59 (1995) (discussing a major-
ity approach as justification for direct democracy). Petitions proposing initia-
tive statutes must be signed by registered voters. The number of signatures
must be equal to at least five percent of the total votes cast for governor at the
last gubernatorial election. CAL. CONST., art. II, § A, cl. 8(b). See also CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 9035.
64. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 152-59; Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation
on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 477, 522-23 (1996) (outlining a three-step initiative interpretation proc-
ess for courts).
65. Landau, supra note 9, at 489-90 (analyzing both Schacter's and
Frickey's proposals for new initiative interpretation theories).
66. Schacter, supra note 1, at 124-25 (concluding that voter "intent" is im-
possible to determine because of the composition and qualities of the electorate).
67. Landau, supra note 9, at 488-90.
68. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 337.
69. Landau, supra note 9, at 488.
988 Vol: 45
PROPOSITION 36
democracy cases,7° it is necessary to review the traditional in-
terpretive theories generally employed in order to compre-
hend their resulting decisions.7 The common methodologies
may be broadly grouped into two complementary classes:
theories of interpretation and canons of construction.72 The
canons function as tools and guidelines for the theories.7"
1. Traditional Theories of Interpretation
The prominent theories of interpretation may be sepa-
rated into four general categories: textual, intentionalist, pur-
posive, and dynamic (although it is unusual for a judge to ref-
erence a particular interpretive framework employed in a
decision).74
a. Textual Theory of Interpretation
Textual interpretation can be best described as an at-
tempt to discern legislative intent through the "plain mean-
ing" of the statutory text.75 A strict textualist judge will gen-
erally feel that the statute should be interpreted according to
its facial language and that any exterior evidence of legisla-
tive intent is irrelevant." Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia, for example, is an avowed textualist.77 Justification
for this theory lies in the assumption that legislators were de-
liberate in their choice of words and that the statute should
reflect those choices.
b. Intentionalist Theory of Interpretation
The comparable, and most popular, theory of interpreta-
tion,79 the intentionalist approach, adopts similar assump-
tions about the legislature and may also employ some textual-
70. Id.
71. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
72. Id. (including a third class, "evaluative criteria").
73. See id.
74. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 211-47 (2000); O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
75. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 223 (also discussing the "soft plain
meaning" theory, which advocates that a court look beyond a strict textual read-
ing so as to recognize legislative intent as well).
76. Id.
77. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 298.
78. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 223.
79. See Landau, supra note 9, at 491.
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ist methodology, such as "plain meaning" construction. ° This
theory is broader than textualism because an intentionalist
court attempts to establish how the legislature would have
wanted the statute applied in a particular case by using a va-
riety of legislative history sources,81 including committee re-
ports and floor speeches.82
c. Purposive Theory of Interpretation
Not content to rely solely on legislative history, a pur-
posive approach encompasses a more general recognition of a
statute's objective, acknowledging the ambiguity often inher-
ent when attempting to determine "specific" legislative in-
tent.' Purposivism asks the question, "what is the overall
goal of the statute?"' Additionally, a secondary goal of a pur-
posivist is to interpret the statute such that it is "coherently
and harmoniously" incorporated into the total legal body. 5
This theory of interpretation was prominent in judicial deci-
sions from the New Deal period.6
d. Dynamic Theory of Interpretation
Lastly, a dynamic style of interpretation construes a
statute according to society's evolving public values.87 The
dynamic theory contends that a statute's meaning is some-
what "fluid" and should be applied differently over time, stay-
ing in line with social mores and principles.88 As with pur-
posivism, a dynamic analysis endeavors to provide statutory
meaning that will maintain consistency within the legal sys-
tem as a whole.89 This goal may also be subordinated in the
face of evolving public values that necessitate the abandon-
ment of outdated precedents. 0 Thus, a dynamic approach
may help to explain many decisions that break precedent or
80. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 223.
81. Id. at 214.
82. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
83. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 220.
84. Id. at 221.
85. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-78
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
86. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 221.
87. Id. at 237.
88. Id.
89. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 298.
90. Id. at 298-99.
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are unjustified by traditional authoritative legal sources."
2. Canons of Construction
In applying the general interpretive theories, courts have
developed common guidelines to aid in the deciphering of un-
clear or ambiguous statutory language.92 Under a textualist
approach, some common canons address issues of sentence
structure and semantics.93 An example of this type is the
"rule of the last antecedent," under which qualifying words in
a statute are meant to only refer to the last antecedent,
unless punctuation or policy indicate otherwise.94 These lin-
guistic canons may also be relied upon by intentionalists, on
the premise that statute drafters make conscious and delib-
erate grammatical choices.95
Of a different nature, the "rule of lenity" is a substantive
canon." This rule instructs that if a criminal statute is am-
biguous, it should be construed in a manner most favorable to
the defendant.97 Because this canon embraces public values
like the desirability of providing fair notice to would-be de-
fendants,98 it may be used and justified by both dynamic and
purposive interpretation followers."
An additional category of substantive canons, also appli-
cable to both the purposive and dynamic frameworks, consists
of the canons employed to promote legal coherence.' This
category may be divided into "internal consistency canons," or
canons pertaining to the structure of the statute, and "conti-
nuity canons," or those canons that focus on the statute's fit
into an overall statutory scheme.' 0 '
91. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 237 (explaining that courts are
reluctant to explicitly promote this theory due to the fear that it lacks sufficient
constraints on judges and that it may not provide citizens with appropriate no-
tice or guidance).
92. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 299.
93. Id.
94. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 258.
95. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 299.
96. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978)
("[wihere there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor
of the defendant") (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
97. Id.
98. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 345, 345-46 (1995).
99. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300.
100. Id.
101. Id.
9912005
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When applying an internal consistency canon to a statu-
tory provision, a court will seek an interpretation that main-
tains coherence with the entire statute and its purpose, in-
stead of viewing the provision as an isolated clause.
102
Alternatively, a continuity canon will encourage an interpre-
tation favoring the status quo by "not changing existing un-
derstandings [of the law] any more than is needed to imple-
ment the statutory objective."' 3 This canon helps to reconcile
the inherent tension in the dynamic theory caused by the
competing interests of consistency, changing public values,
and judicial restraint.10 4
F. California Supreme Court Implementation of Proposition
36
To date, the California Supreme Court has handed down
two Proposition 36 implementation decisions.' 0 One of these
decisions, People v. Floyd, addresses the initiative's retroac-
tive application and is the subject of this comment. 6 The
other, In re Varnell, involves restricting a trial court's discre-
tion to dismiss or reduce charges, pursuant to Penal Code
Section 1385, so that a defendant might remain eligible under
Proposition 36.10'
The court is also currently reviewing questions concern-
ing the interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "misdemeanor
not related to the use of drugs."'08 People v. Ayele'0 examines
102. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 835 (3d ed.
2001).
103. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925 (1992) (discussing the desirability and difficulties of
maintaining legal continuity).
104. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 298-99 (explaining how dynamic interpreta-
tion will generally favor recognition of public values over 'outmoded legislative
purposes").
105. Abrahamson & Abassi, supra note 13, at 517-18.
106. People v. Floyd, 72 P.3d 817 (Cal. 2003).
107. In re Varnell, 70 P.3d 1037, 1041, 1042 (Cal. 2003) (citing California Pe-
nal Code section 1385 (West Supp. 2005) and holding that Proposition 36
"leaves no room for weighing of the effect of facts" and that section 1385 "could
[not] be used to disregard sentencing factors" that might disqualify a defendant
for Proposition 36 treatment and that are explicitly addressed within the initia-
tive's language).
108. Abrahamson & Abassi, supra note 13, at 3.
109. People v. Ayele, 102 Cal. App. 4th 1276 (2002), rev. granted, 63 P.3d 213
(Cal. 2003), rev. dismissed, 99 P.3d 3 (Cal. 2004).
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the issue of whether a defendant convicted of resisting arrest
while under the influence of drugs should still retain Proposi-
tion 36 eligibility. Similarly, People v. Canty110 involves
Proposition 36 applicability to a defendant convicted of driv-
ing under the influence of a controlled substance.
1. Background and Context of People v. Floyd
Prior to the Floyd holding, a lower court addressed one
possible retroactive scenario regarding Proposition 36 appli-
cation."' With In re DeLong,12 the court of appeals deter-
mined that if a defendant was found guilty, but not sentenced
until after the effective date of July 1, 2001, Proposition 36
would apply."' The California Supreme Court, however, de-
cided to address a slightly different retroactive applicability
issue."4 Floyd, and its companion case for review, People v.
Fryman,"5 examined whether a defendant with a guilty ver-
dict and sentencing prior to July 1, 2001, could still qualify
for retroactive Proposition 36 eligibility."6
On April 30, 2000, Andre Floyd ("Floyd") was arrested for
possession of a small bag containing 0.25 grams of cocaine. " '
On November 7, 2000, the voters passed Proposition 36. "8
Floyd had a criminal history consisting of five prior felony
convictions, the last occurring in 1985. "' Two days after the
election, a jury convicted Floyd of felony drug possession and
gave him a third strike sentence of twenty-five years to life.
21
Floyd's jury conviction occurred after the enactment of Propo-
sition 36 in the general election, but before the initiative's ef-
fective date of July 1, 2001, raising the issue of whether a
pending appeal on the effective date can permit a defendant
to rely upon Proposition 36.121
110. People v. Canty, 90 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Cal. 2004).
111. Abrahamson & Abassi, supra note 13, at 519.
112. In re DeLong, 93 Cal. App. 4th 562 (2001).
113. Id. at 564.
114. See Abrahamson & Abassi, supra note 13, at 519 (discussing the retroac-
tive categories addressed by the courts).
115. People v. Fryman, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1315 rev. granted, 54 P.3d 260 (Cal.
2002), transferred, 76 P.3d 363 (Cal. 2003).
116. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 817; Fryman, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 1315.
117. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 820-21.
118. Id. at 821.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Abrahamson & Abassi, supra note 13, at 3.
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Appealing the trial court's sentence, Floyd argued for the
application of Proposition 36 treatment to his non-violent
drug possession offense, as his conviction was not yet final
because of his appeal.' His main theory relied upon the
Estrada rule, which holds that "[i]f the amendatory statute
lessening punishment becomes effective prior to the date the
judgment of conviction becomes final then.., it, and not the
old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed,
applies."'23 In People v. Estrada,'24 the court allowed for a ret-
roactive application of an amended statute that reduced the
penalties for a non-violent prison escape. Floyd argued in the
alternative that denying him retroactive eligibility is an equal
protection violation;25 however, the latter contention is not
discussed in this comment.2 '
Unfortunately for Floyd, Estrada also held that its rule
does not apply when there is a "saving clause" within the
statute which indicates that it should only operate prospec-
tively, with the old law applying to past acts.'27 The court
found that such a clause exists within Section 8 of the initia-
tive."'8 Section 8 reads: "Except as otherwise provided, the
provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and
its provisions shall be applied prospectively."'29
In light of the saving clause, the court posed the ques-
tion, ' ° to "ascertain the legislative intent-did the [voters] in-
tend the old or new statute to apply?""1 Thus, by relying
upon traditional textualist and intentionalist interpretation
122. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821.
123. In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965).
124. Id at 948.
125. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 820, 822. Floyd's equal protection claim is the weaker
of the two arguments and the California Supreme Court found there to be no
constitutional violation when imposing different sentencing schemes on differ-
ent classes of defendants based on the application of an effective date. Id. at
824-27. Additionally, Justice Brown's dissent does not address the equal protec-
tion argument. Id. at 827-30 (Brown, J., dissenting).
126. Issues pertaining to initiative constitutionality are beyond the scope of
this comment.
127. Estrada, 408 P.2d at 952.
128. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821.
129. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 8 (entitled "Effective Date," this section was not codified after the
initiative passed), available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl
(last visited Apr. 25, 2004).
130. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821-22.
131. Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951.
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theories in its analysis, the court found the presence of the
saving clause to sufficiently indicate the voters' intent to deny
Proposition 36 eligibility to defendants in Floyd's position.'32
It reached this decision by employing canons of semantic con-
struction and canons of coherence,'33 while rejecting the rule
of lenity.' The saving clause was also used to reject Floyd's
contention that he is "convicted" within the meaning of the
Act only when his conviction becomes final with the conclu-
sion of the appeal process."'
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brown argued for the ap-
plication of the rule of lenity with regard to the saving clause
and effective date of the Act.' 6 She also identified a prior su-
preme court case that conflicts with the majority's decision
regarding Floyd's "conviction" status.'37
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
With the California Supreme Court's refusal to allow ret-
roactive eligibility under Proposition 36, Floyd was sentenced
to a twenty-five-year prison sentence for possession of one
quarter gram of a controlled substance."3 This outcome re-
sulted from the court's application of strict textual and inten-
tionalist theories of statutory interpretation to the initia-
tive. 9 Because of the court's approach, and its failure to
account for the differences between a legislatively produced
statute and a voter initiative,' ° Floyd's sentence serves to un-
dermine the purpose and intent behind the voters' decision to
pass the initiative, namely "[t]o divert from incarceration into
community-based substance abuse treatment programs non-
violent defendants, probationers and parolees charged with
simple drug possession or drug use offenses."
132. See generally Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821-24.
133. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300-01.
134. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 824.
135. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823-24.
136. Id. at 827-30 (Brown, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 829 (Brown, J., dissenting and discussing People v. Treadwell, 66
Cal. 400, 401 (Cal. 1885) which held that an appeal to the supreme court served
to suspend the conviction judgment of the lower court "for all purposes").
138. Id. at 179.
139. See generally id.
140. Landau, supra note 9, at 490.
141. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 3(a), available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl
(last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
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The question then becomes, what should be the proper
interpretation theories and constructive canons to be used by
a court when determining rules of implementation for a voter
initiative?
IV. ANALYSIS
The California voters enacted Proposition 36 by a signifi-
cant sixty-one percent majority.14 As discussed, the chances
that the average voter read either the text of the initiative or
the ballot pamphlets produced by the office of the Secretary of
State are low.1 43  However, it is reasonable to assume that
voters in support of the initiative were at least aware of its
general directive that "any person convicted of a non-violent
drug possession offense shall receive probation. " '"
Yet, in spite of the numerous ways in which Proposition
36 is distinguished from a traditional statute, the supreme
court sentenced Floyd to twenty-five years in prison for co-
caine possession."' With its rigid approach, focusing on tex-
tual and structural analysis, 146 the court held the voters to
standards of legal comprehension and decision-making au-
thority that should be reserved solely for the legislature. Per-
haps if Proposition 36 was a referendum, originating from the
legislature," the court's reasoning could be justified. But
Proposition 36 is an initiative, and the court misrepresented
the intent of the electorate."8
At the outset of its holding, the court recognized that
Floyd's drug possession offense, taken in the abstract, quali-
fied him for Proposition 36's benefits.' However, because the
Estrada rule could be nullified, and it might be interpreted
that Floyd's "conviction" and sentencing occurred before July
1, 2001, the case presented the question of whether he re-
142. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
143. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 136. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F.
FEENEY, IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR
CHANGE 136, 133 (1992).
144. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 313 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(a)
(West Supp. 2005)).
145. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821.
146. See id.
147. Schacter, supra note 1.
148. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 829 (Brown, J., dissenting and addressing the in-
carceration costs that the majority's holding would impose on the state).
149. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821.
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mained eligible.15 °
In his defense, Floyd primarily argued that the court's
holding in Estrada should apply to resolve the issue in his fa-
vor.' He also contended that due to his pending appeal, his
conviction was not yet final and he was therefore not "con-
victed," per the language of the Act, before the effective
date.' But the court rejected these arguments by rendering
the Estrada rule inapplicable with its intentionalist interpre-
tation of the saving clause and by failing to acknowledge dif-
ferent meanings of the term "convicted.""3
A. The Saving Clause
As an exception to its central holding that an "amenda-
tory statute lessening punishment" should be applied in favor
of the old statute, Estrada acknowledged that the presence of
a saving clause might indicate the legislature's intent to have
the new statute applied prospectively." Otherwise, the case
embraced the reasonable inference that because the new
statute is ameliorative, the legislature will want it to apply to
all defendants who may be constitutionally eligible."5
In Floyd, the court found that Section 8 of the Proposition
36 text represents the type of saving clause that may rebut
the Estrada rule.'56 To determine whether Section 8 does in-
deed act to disqualify Floyd, the court decided to establish the
"legislative intent" behind Section 8's inclusion in the initia-
tive. "' Thus, at the outset of its analysis, the court embraced
an intentionalist theory of interpretation and proceeded as if
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 823 (incorrectly citing subdivision (b)(1) in section 1210.1, which
relates to disqualifying circumstances or conduct). California Penal Code sec-
tion 1210.1(a) appears to be the subdivision the court is actually referencing:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subdivi-
sion (b), any person convicted of a non-violent drug possession offense shall re-
ceive probation." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210. 1(a) (West Supp. 2005).
153. Id. at 823, 828-29.
154. Estrada, 408 P.2d at 952.
155. Id. at 950.
156. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823-24. Section 8 reads: "Except as otherwise pro-
vided, the provisions of this Act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its pro-
visions shall be applied prospectively."
157. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 822 ("[wlhether Proposition 36 applies here requires us
to ascertain the legislative intent--did the [voters] intend the old or new statute
to apply").
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Proposition 36 was a legislatively enacted statute.'
By embracing this approach, the court made no reference
to the unique circumstances surrounding a California voter
initiative,15 9 circumstances that make it ill-suited to an inten-
tionalist interpretation."' The court failed to acknowledge
that although California voters are the ones enacting the law,
studies show that only a fraction of them actually read the
initiative text. 6 ' Moreover, in a study by David Magleby, it
was shown that voters in Oregon and California would need a
college to post-graduate equivalent reading level (possessed
by less than twenty percent of voters) to comprehend the legal
initiative language.'62
Yet, despite readily available knowledge of the California
electorate's limited comprehension abilities with regard to
initiative ballot text, 63 the Floyd court proceeded down a dif-
ficult path to find the elusive "popular intent"' based on the
inclusion of Section 8.165 Citing one of its previous holdings,'66
the court laid out its reason for according determinative
weight to Section 8: "The rule in Estrada, of course, is not im-
plicated where the Legislature clearly signals its intent to
make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of an ex-
press saving clause or its equivalent."'67
By proceeding from this basis, the court wrongly equated
the voting populace with a legislature." It assumed the vot-
ers are cognizant of the judicial import of the inclusion of a
saving clause, 69 stating, "[w]e therefore conclude that this
language, at least when read in isolation, reveals an intent to
158. Id.
159. Schacter, supra note 1, at 124-25.
160. Id.
161. Charlene W. Simmons, California's Statewide Initiative Process, Cali-
fornia Research Bureau, May, 12 (1997), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/06/97006.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
162. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 118-19.
163. See generally Schacter, supra note 1, at 139-43.
164. See id. at 128 (arguing that voter intent is a "phantom" created by ma-
nipulative initiative drafters and proponents).
165. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 817-24; Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance
Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, § 8, available at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
166. People v. Nasalga, 12 Cal. 4th 784, 793 (Werdegar, J., plurality opinion).
167. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821-22.
168. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 117-20.
169. See id. at 141 (noting the practice of courts to attribute voters with
knowledge of the legal framework encompassing the statute).
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avoid the Estrada rule.""' This preliminary textualist conclu-
sion was a faulty foundation upon which to support the
court's remaining analysis.
1. Textual Interpretation of the Saving Clause
Regardless of the logical fallacies with an attempt to dis-
cern voter intent within the technical minutiae of initiative
text,'' the court continued its intentionalist interpretation by
undertaking a textual analysis of the saving clause.' Obli-
gated to defend under this approach, Floyd put forth his own
textual argument based on the presence of Section 8's intro-
ductory clause: "Except as otherwise provided... ."' He
claimed that this opening clause works to modify the second
main clause in the section: "its provisions shall be applied
prospectively."' 4 With this construction, he contended that
the intent of the phrasing is to have Proposition 36 applied
retroactively, as an exception, when the ameliorative circum-
stances of Estrada are present.
7 5
However, instead of acknowledging the possible legiti-
macy of Floyd's construction and exploring the applicability of
the rule of lenity1'76 to the clause, the court relied upon its in-
tentionalist and textualist canons and employed the last an-
tecedent rule,"7 casting doubt upon Floyd's reasonable inter-
pretation of Section 8.178
In the context of representative-produced statutes, a
court's use of semantic canons may be justified by the as-
sumption that a legislature is a sophisticated and educated
group of decision makers.' 9 One may presume that legisla-
tors or their staff have a working knowledge of prominent ju-
170. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 821-22.
171. Schacter, supra note 1, at 139 (criticizing the importance that courts as-
sign to ballot text in a pursuit of voter intent).
172. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 822-23.
173. Id.; Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Preven-
tion Act of 2000, § 8, available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl
(last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
174. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 8, available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last
visited Apr. 9, 2004).
175. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 822.
176. See, e.g.,Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 285 (1978).
177. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 74, at 258.
178. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 822-23.
179. Landau, supra note 9, at 501.
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dicial methods of interpretation and will make a conscious ef-
fort to recognize prior judicial decisions and common con-
structive canons when drafting statutes. 8 '
Additionally, in accord with its reliance on a legislature's
presumed wisdom, an intentionalist court will turn to legisla-
tive documentary evidence to assist in determining the intent
of a statute.'81 But with a voter initiative, the courts may only
have ballot pamphlets to rely upon.'82 Indeed, the Floyd court
supported its plain meaning interpretation of the saving
clause with reference to the proponent's argument in the offi-
cial ballot pamphlet."
Yet, by relying on ballot pamphlets and other campaign
resources, not only did the court give weight to biased writ-
ings of the proponents and opponents, it further assumed
that voters actually read and relied upon the pamphlets
themselves."8 This is a leap of faith since statistical data
suggests that a majority of voters do not read ballot pam-
phlets in addition to initiative text.
8 6
Therefore, when interpreting a voter initiative, the tradi-
tional underlying justifications for a textual or intentionalist
framework must necessarily be abandoned because of the
relatively plebeian makeup of the electorate.'87 In light of
Magleby's findings' and a reasonable assumption that the
majority of voters are unfamiliar with statutory drafting
methods used to nullify the Estrada rule, one can logically
reach the conclusion that the saving clause was meant to
benefit defendants in Floyd's position. 18  By turning a blind
180. Id.
181. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
182. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 141-42.
183. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823-24; Proposition 36 Voter Guide, Argument in Fa-
vor of Proposition 36 (2000) (stating, "[i]f Proposition 36 passes, nonviolent drug
offenders convicted for the first or second time after 7/1/2001, will get manda-
tory, court-supervised, treatment instead of jail"), available at
http://www.vote2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/texttext-yesarg-36.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2004).
184. Schacter, supra note 1, at 142.
185. Landau, supra note 9, at 498-99 (discussing the informal hierarchy com-
parison between legislative history sources and voters' pamphlet materials).
186. MAGLEBY, supra note 5, at 136; see DUBOIS ET AL., supra note 143, at
133.
187. See id.
188. See MAGLEBY, supra note 5.
189. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 827-28 (arguing that the saving clause and the
Estrada rule can work to allow the initiative's benefits to encompass defendants
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eye to this fact, the court misrepresented the voters' true in-
tent for Proposition 36.190
2. Internal Consistency and the Saving Clause
Not content to rest on its narrow textual analysis, the
court continued to ignore Proposition 36's purpose by proceed-
ing to use substantive canons of coherence to justify the de-
nial of Estrada's ameliorative benefits. 9' In response to
Floyd's contention that Section 8's introductory clause
"merely defines a nonexclusive class of defendants [who] are
eligible for its provisions,"'92 the court made use of an internal
consistency canon 93 to narrow the scope of exceptions beyond
his reach.' It held that Section 8 only addresses the Act's
explicit retroactive application to probationers or parolees
who were convicted of nonviolent drug offenses prior to the ef-
fective date.'95 The court justified this conclusion with a
structural argument, proclaiming that Section 8's "applied
prospectively" clause would be devoid of meaning if Floyd's
broad reading of the introductory clause was correct:'96 "We
cannot embrace an interpretation that makes Section 8 mere
surplusage." 9' This conclusion was also the basis for the
court's dismissal of Floyd's contention that he was not "con-
victed" under the Act with his conviction not final on ap-
peal.198
Thus, while the court's use of a structural consistency
canon produced a reasonable interpretation in isolation, 199 the
application was nevertheless faulty, because the statutory
whose convictions were not final as of July 1, 2001) (Brown, J., dissenting).
190. See generally id. at 827-30.
191. See id. at 823-24 (discussing other provisions in the Act and prior judi-
cial precedent that may affect Section 8's interpretation); O'Hear, supra note 15,
at 300-01.
192. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823.
193. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300-01.
194. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823.
195. Id. at 822-23. If a person is on probation or parole for a nonviolent drug
offense prior to the effective date, and then violates probation or parole with a
nonviolent drug offense, Proposition 36's benefits will be available. CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1210.1(3)(D)-(F), 3063.1(d)(3)(C),(D) (West Supp. 2005).
196. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823; Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance
Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, § 8, available at
http//www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
197. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 823.
198. Id. at 823-24.
199. Id.
2005 1001
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
purpose remains paramount when using that tool.2" The
structural interpretation should give way if found to be in
conflict with the overall objective of the voter initiative."1
Nevertheless, the court's holding mandated a sentence for
Floyd that went against the very core of Proposition 36. '02
3. Continuity Canons and the Saving Clause
Continuing to disregard the initiative's purpose, the court
turned to another substantive canon as it attempted to inter-
pret Section 8 in a manner least disruptive to the existing
body of drug possession law.0 Applying a continuity canon,"°4
the court doggedly sought to enforce the old law, punishable
as a felony, for as long as possible.0 5
Using judicial precedent to support that approach, it be-
gan by taking note of the voters' "decision" to delay the effec-
tive date of the proposition by eight months from the date of
its enactment.' °6 It then proceeded with a laundry list of
cases which uniformly held that a legislature's "decision" to
postpone a statute's effective date evinces a clear intent that
it not have retroactive application. '
But this direction once again ignored the general intent
of Proposition 36208 with a reliance upon the continuity canon
to aid the interpretation.2 0'9 Although the aim of this type of
canon is to preserve the existing legal regime, with its use in
200. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 301 ("[sltatutory provisions should not be read
in isolation but as part of a larger statutory scheme; courts should avoid inter-
pretations that undermine other provisions or defeat the overall objectives of
the statute").
201. Id.
202. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 3(a) ("Purpose and intent"), available at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). One of
the stated purposes of the Act was "[t]o divert from incarceration into commu-
nity-based substance abuse treatment programs non-violent defendants, proba-
tioners and parolees charged with simple drug possession or drug use offenses."
Id.
203. See, e.g., Floyd, 72 P.3d at 824.
204. O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300-01.
205. See generally Floyd, 72 P.3d at 824.
206. Id. (addressing the eight-month gap between Proposition 36's approval
on November 7, 2000, and its effective date of July 1, 2001).
207. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 824.
208. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 3(a) ("Purpose and Intent"), available at
http'//www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
209. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300-01.
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Floyd, "those interests carr[y] little weight because they pre-
served legislative judgments that had been clearly rejected by
the initiative. '1 °  Therefore, as with an internal structure
canon, these constructive guidelines are ultimately better
suited for purposive or dynamic approaches and should influ-
ence a court's analysis up to the point when the interpreta-
tion would contradict the statute or initiative's ultimate
goal.211
Furthermore, the cases cited by the court involve the in-
terpretations of actions taken by legislatures, not initiatives
enacted by the voters.21 ' The voters were thus once more im-
properly assigned the same traits as a legislature: legal com-
prehension and foresight."3
B. Justice Brown's Dissent
As Justice Brown illustrated in her lone dissent, even
while using the substantive canons, the majority could have
reached alternative, supportable conclusions regarding Sec-
tion 8.21'4 As a foundation for her arguments, she relied upon
the "Purpose and Intent" section of the initiative.1 5 Citing In
re DeLong,1 6 she attacked the majority's narrow use of the
retroactive probation/parole provisions in its structural inter-
pretation. 7 She argued that instead of showing an intent to
restrict Proposition 36's applicability, the probation/parole
provisions do just the opposite, as they indicate that the ini-
tiative was intended to have a broad, encompassing reach,
consistent with its stated purposes.218
Additionally, Justice Brown called into question the ma-
210. See id. at 315.
211. See id. at 301.
212. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 824 (relying on a list of cases that never make refer-
ence to an initiative).
213. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 126-28.
214. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 827-30 (Brown, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 827; Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime
Prevention Act of 2000, § 3(a)-(c), available at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
216. In re DeLong, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 561 ("[N]o rationale appears to exclude
from its wide reach the limited class of defendants who, as of the effective date,
had been adjudged guilty and were awaiting sentencing").
217. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 827 (Brown, J., dissenting).
218. Id.; Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Preven-
tion Act of 2000, § 3(a)-(c) ("Purpose and intent"), available at
httpJ/www.drugreform.org/prop36/fulltext.tpl (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
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jority's use of precedent to provide a prospective intent to the
delayed effective date.219 She pointed out that the actual rea-
son for the initiative's postponement was purely "practical.",
20
The eight-month delay was necessary to set up the required
infrastructure of treatment facilities.221 This argument of a
legitimate need is especially effective when compared to the
majority's erroneous use of a Court of Appeals of New York
case that held, "[i]f the amendments were to have retroactive
effect, there would have been no need for any postpone-
ment" Justice Brown suggested that other reasons do exist
for a statute's postponement than to merely indicate an oppo-
sition to retroactive application.221
Finally, Justice Brown dismissed the majority's conten-
tion that Section 8 would be surplusage if read generously.
224
She reasoned that the delayed date can be given meaning by
reading it to preclude defendants with final convictions before
July 1, 2001, because time was needed to implement the
treatment program.22' This reasoning raised the subsequent
question of whether Floyd was actually "convicted" prior to
July 1, 2001, despite his appeal.226  But Justice Brown ad-
dressed this inquiry by pointing out that California does not
have a "fixed definition" for the term "convicted," and the
court could have relied upon prior case precedent, People v.
Treadwell,227 which held that a "defendant has not been fi-
nally convicted if an appeal is pending."
28
Consequently, Justice Brown argued that in light of
Proposition 36's purpose of reducing the number of defen-
dants incarcerated in California for drug possession and
use,21 the ambiguities in the case required the court to apply
219. Floyd, 31 72 P.3d at 827-28 (Brown, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 828.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 824 (citing Deutsch v. Catherwood, 31 N.Y. 2d 487, 489 (1973)).
223. See id.
224. Id. at 829 (Brown, J., dissenting).
225. People v. Floyd, 72 P.3d 820, 829 (2003) (Brown, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 829.
227. 5 P. 686 (Cal. 1885).
228. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 829 (Brown, J., dissenting and citing Treadwell, 5 P. at
987 (Cal. 1885)).
229. Ballot Text of Proposition 36, Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention
Act of 2000, § 3(a)-(c) ("Purpose and intent"), available at
http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/ffulltext.tpl (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).
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the rule of lenity to preserve Floyd's probation eligibility.23 °
Instead, with the majority's explicit refusal to use that public
policy canon, 1 its intentionalist interpretation "frustrate[d]
rather than promote[d] the purpose and intent of the initia-
tive. 232
V. PROPOSAL: PURPOSIVE OR DYNAMIC INTERPRETATIONS OF
INITIATIVES
In light of the supreme court's questionable interpreta-
tions, it is evident that California courts should adopt pur-
posive or dynamic interpretive approaches when addressing a
voter initiative.233 The outcome of DeLong reflected analytical
conclusions that succeeded in representing the will of the vot-
ers. 34 The DeLong court's "purpose-oriented" approach 235 al-
lowed it to view the case, and the initiative, with an eye to-
wards producing a result consistent with electorate
expectations." Therefore, as implied by Justice Brown's
support of the DeLong reasoning,37 when interpreting a voter
initiative a court should first acknowledge its purpose, then
proceed with its analysis from that foundation.
Alternatively, a court may adopt a dynamic theory of in-
terpretation if it wishes to correctly construe voter intent.
Because this theory accords more significance to the notion of
changing public values than to legal c, 238 ichaningpubic an galcoherence , t repre-
230. Floyd, 72 P.3d at 829-30. (Brown, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 824 (stating that, "[tihe rule of lenity applies 'only if the court can
do no more than guess what the legislative body intended'" (quoting People v.
Avery, 38 P.3d 1, 6 (Cal. 2002)).
232. Id. at 830 (Brown, J., dissenting).
233. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 301. The author discusses the "evaluative
criteria" to be used and weighed when deciding which interpretive theory is
best-suited for the case: First, the "rule of law" factor addresses issues of pre-
dictability, ease of understanding for ordinary citizens, and neutral application
of the statute. Second, the "democratic legitimacy" factor relates to the weight
an interpretive approach gives to policy choices emanating from the democratic
process, either through the legislature or directly from the voters. Third, the
"pragmatism" factor looks to how an interpretive method will promote "legiti-
mate public policy objectives. Id.
234. Id. at 313.
235. Id.
236. In re DeLong, 93 Cal. App. 4th at 570 (stating that "[tihe voters delayed
the effective date to July 1, 2001, so that treatment facilities could be in place,
not out of a desire to preserve the stricter sentencing scheme for nonviolent
drug offenders for a few more months").
237. See Floyd, 72 P.3d at 828 (Brown, J., dissenting).
238. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 298-99.
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sents a logical choice for a court faced with a voter initiative.
This conclusion is justified by an initiative's very exis-
tence, which represents the electorate's decision to implement
change."' This is especially true in regard to Propositions 215
and 36, where the voters felt they needed to take certain drug
law reform issues away from the legislature. 4 ' Therefore,
when using a dynamic base for analysis, a court will attribute
more significance to the electorate's motives than to "out-
"2141
moded legislative purposes.
A. Correct Use of Canons of Coherence
Along with using a dynamic or purposive approach,
courts must employ the canons of construction that best com-
plement these theories. When an initiative relates to crimi-
nal law reform, the rule of lenity42 should feature promi-
nently in a court's analysis if ambiguity arises. This canon
embodies public policy issues related to basic notions of jus-t. 243
tice, and, as explained above, Floyd represents an erroneous
decision to avoid its use.24
Additionally, the invocation of substantive coherence
canons, as discussed earlier, will serve to supply necessary
measures of judicial restraint, structure, and continuity.245
However, when using them, courts should not allow consis-
tency interests to trump the overall purpose of the initiative.
B. Judicial Constraint and Guidance Concerns
There is a fear that purposive or dynamic approaches
may provide courts with too much leeway and subjective au-
thority to fashion new rules. But this fear will always be
prevalent if a court is to recognize that society's principles
and concerns change over time, and it is not a valid reason to
ignore the realities of the initiative process.246
239. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 113.
240. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 298-99.
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978)
("[W]here there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor
of the defendant.") (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
243. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 299-300.
244. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
245. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 300.
246. See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 1, at 139 (discussing a study that found
the majority of the electorate did not even read the text of ballot propositions).
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An additional concern is that the declared "purpose" of an
initiative will be subject to manipulation by an initiative's
drafters, resulting in long and "strategically ambiguous" bal-
lots.247 This concern seems exaggerated because courts should
be capable of reconciling a possibly ambiguous "Purpose and
Intent" section of an initiative with the overall message com-
municated to the voters during a campaign.
A challenge of this type faced the Floyd court again as it
considered People v. Canty24 to determine if a misdemeanor
conviction of driving under the influence of a controlled sub-
stance fell outside the reach of Proposition 36. A thin argu-
ment could be made that a misdemeanor of this type should
be included, so as to keep another drug user from being incar-
cerated. However, in keeping with the unanimous holdings of
the lower courts, the supreme court found that driving while
under the influence of drugs is not included in Proposition
36's coverage."' In contrast to Floyd, the Canty decision is
consistent with what the voters understood to be the purpose
of the initiative: Proposition 36 will not extend to defendants
who jeopardize public safety with their criminal acts.250
VI. CONCLUSION
The enactment of Proposition 36 is the result of the Cali-
fornia electorate taking the "initiative" to effect a fundamen-
tal change in the state's approach to issues of drug depend-
ence and the "drug war.""' A statute or initiative raises
questions and challenges as to how it will be applied in a
given situation.12 To resolve these issues and establish rules
for implementation, courts rely upon various theories of in-
terpretation to guide their analysis.' The most widely used
of these is the intentionalist theory, which seeks to identify
the legislature's intended meaning for a statute. 54
Problems arise however, when an intentionalist approach
is used to interpret an initiative, because there is no legisla-
247. Id. at 146-47 (arguing against a purposive approach).
248. 90 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Cal. 2004).
249. See id. at 1179.
250. See generally Abrahamson & Abbasi, supra note 13, at 517.
251. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 291.
252. See generally Schacter, supra note 1, at 109-10.
253. See O'Hear, supra note 15, at 297.
254. Landau, supra note 9, at 491-92; Schacter, supra note 1, at 110.
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tive intent to be found, only the popular intent of millions of
voters."' Unfortunately, this was the method used by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Floyd, where its inter-
pretation of Proposition 36 upheld a conviction and sentenc-
ing of twenty-five years to life for simple cocaine possession.256
Because the court's decision contradicted the objective of
217the initiative, courts should engage in purposive or dynamic
interpretation when construing voter initiatives. Either of
these approaches, when used in combination with correspond-
ing substantive canons of construction, will foster a decision
that best comports with the expectations of the electorate.
255. See Schacter, supra note 1, at 117-18.
256. See generally People v. Floyd, 72 P.3d 820 (Cal. 2003).
257. See Proposition 36, § 3 ("Purpose and Intent"), in SECRETARY OF STATE,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, GENERAL
ELECTION: Nov. 7, 2000 at 66 (2000), available at
http://vote2000.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/pdf/textproposedlaws.pdf (last visited Aug.
5, 2005).
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